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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 990753-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to one 
count of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with 
intent to distribute, a third degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was defendant seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when he answered questions posed by an officer after 
the officer had stopped defendant's vehicle, issued a warning 
citation, and returned his documentation without any conduct 
indicating that defendant was not free to go? 
Whether a defendant is constitutionally seized presents a 
question of law, reviewed nondeferentially for correctness, but 
with a "measure of discretion to the trial judge/' State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
2. Does defendant's attenuation analysis apply to a consent 
to search given during a consensual encounter with no prior 
police illegality? 
Whether a principle of law applies to a given set of facts 
presents a legal question, reviewed for correctness. Wilde v. 
Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah App. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After a Utah Highway Patrol officer discovered close to nine 
pounds of marijuana in the car defendant was driving, defendant 
was charged with one count of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute (R. 1). Defendant filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence (R. 8). Following a preliminary 
hearing, the magistrate bound defendant over for trial and 
accepted his plea of not guilty (R. 9, 39: 13). Based on the 
evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing, the court denied 
2 
defendant's suppression motion (R. 11-14 or addendum A). 
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, and the court 
sentenced him to zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 
15-22, 28-29). This timely appeal followed (R. 30-31). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Utah Highway Patrol trooper Steve Salas was patrolling along 
1-70 when he saw defendant approach from the opposite direction 
in a red 1999 Pontiac Grand Am with no front license plate (R. 
39: 3-4). As the car passed by, Salas saw that the vehicle bore 
a Nevada rear plate. Knowing that Nevada required front plates, 
Officer Salas effectuated a traffic stop (Id.). 
As Officer Salas approached the stopped vehicle, he noticed 
a two inch square, white velvet bag on the back dashboard. He 
then noticed another such bag hanging from the front mirror (Id. 
at 4). When defendant rolled down his window, Salas "noticed a 
fragrance, strong odor [sic] coming from the vehicle, like a 
perfume or air freshener, something of that sort" (Id.). When 
Officer Salas told defendant about the missing license plate, 
defendant immediately wanted to see where it should have been. 
The pair walked to the front of the car, where defendant 
suggested that "it may have fallen off or somebody may have 
stolen the plate" (Id.). The officer then asked defendant to get 
back into the vehicle (Id. at 5). Officer Salas noticed that 
defendant had a pager attached to his belt (Id. at 6). 
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Officer Salas then asked defendant for his driver's license, 
registration, and insurance certificate (Id.). When Salas saw 
that defendant had a Massachusetts driver's license, he asked if 
defendant had purchased the car in Nevada. Defendant answered 
that he had rented the vehicle in Nevada. In response to further 
inquiries, defendant told the officer that he was on business in 
Nevada and that he was in computer sales. Officer Salas 
testified that he "asked him what kind of computers did he sell 
and he told me Microsoft and stuff like that" (Id.). Salas 
elaborated: "When that was his response[,] that struck me kind of 
funny since Microsoft isn't a computer, it's a software. I had 
to ask people that question before [sic] and they're detailed in 
the type of computers that they sell. They usually know what 
they sell" (JdJ . 
Officer Salas returned to his vehicle, ran a license and 
warrants check, and found everything in order (Id.). He then 
wrote out a warning for the missing front license plate, walked 
back to defendant's car, and returned all of defendant's 
documentation (Id. at 6). 
After the officer had issued the warning citation and 
returned all of defendant's papers, he asked defendant more 
questions, and defendant answered them (Id. at 6-7). Ultimately, 
the officer asked for consent to search the vehicle, which 
defendant granted (Id. at 7). In searching a black bag located 
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in the trunk, Officer Salas found a gift-wrapped package, which 
defendant gave him permission to open (Id. at 8). Inside was 
approximately nine pounds of marijuana (Id. at 8, 9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that the officer exceeded the 
constitutional scope of the traffic stop by questioning him on 
matters unrelated to the stop, after a warrants and license check 
had come back clean and after the officer had issued a warning 
citation. This argument fails because, when the officer issued 
the warning citation and returned defendant's documentation 
without any coercive show of authority, the seizure prompted by 
the original traffic stop de-escalated into a consensual 
encounter. Any further conversation between the two, therefore, 
was not subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 
Defendant next contends that his consent to search was 
invalid because it was the product of an illegal police detention 
and was not attenuated from it. However, because the seizure 
ended when the officer returned defendant's documents, the 
subsequent conversation, which included defendant's consent to 
search, was consensual in nature. Consequently, because there 
was no police illegality, there was nothing from which to 




AFTER THE OFFICER COMPLETED THE PURPOSE OF 
THE TRAFFIC STOP BY ISSUING A WARNING 
CITATION AND RETURNING DEFENDANT'S DOCUMENTS 
WITHOUT ANY COERCIVE SHOW OF AUTHORITY, 
DEFENDANT WAS NO LONGER SEIZED FOR FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PURPOSES; CONSEQUENTLY, THE 
SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE TWO WAS 
CONSENSUAL AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Defendant argues that Officer Salas exceeded the permissible 
scope of the traffic stop and thus violated his Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure when, 
after issuing a warning citation and without articulable 
suspicion of other wrongdoing, he questioned defendant about 
matters unrelated to his missing front license plate (Br. of App. 
at 7-8). Consequently, defendant asserts that the marijuana 
ultimately seized by the officer should have been suppressed (Id. 
at 6, 14) . 
The trial court, in denying defendant's suppression motion, 
determined that after the officer checked defendant's driver's 
license, four factors provided reasonable suspicion to continue 
the detention. The trial court cited the following factors as 
supportive of the officer's reasonable suspicion: 1) the driver, 
not from Nevada, was driving a Nevada rental car; 2) the driver 
said he sold Microsoft computers; 3) the officer saw white velvet 
bags on the rear dash and front mirror; and 4) the vehicle 
smelled strongly of air freshener or perfume (R. 12 or addendum 
6 
A). 
In the State's view, the dispositive inquiry is not whether 
Officer Salas had sufficient reasonable suspicion of further 
criminal activity to justify expanding the scope of the stop or 
continuing the detention.1 Rather, the case analytically turns 
on the point in time at which defendant was no longer seized for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. At that juncture, the interchange 
between defendant and the officer became consensual in nature and 
thus beyond the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court's 
denial of defendant's suppression motion should be sustained on 
this analytically sound alternative ground. See Debrv v. Noble, 
889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995)(affirming on alternative grounds); 
State v. S.V.. 906 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1995) (same). 
Not every encounter between the police and a citizen 
constitutes a seizure within the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, both 
federal and state courts have recognized three categories of 
constitutionally permitted police-citizen encounters: 
(l)an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an * articulable suspicion" that 
1
 The officer's initial detention must, of course, also be 
"justified at its inception." Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 
(1968) . In this case, however, defendant raised neither the 
propriety of the initial stop before the trial court nor plain 
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. Consequently, the 
propriety of the initial stop is not at issue here. State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 363 (Utah App. 1993). 
7 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the x>detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(quoting United 
States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)(citation 
omitted)). These categories are not static. Thus, a level one 
consensual encounter can escalate into a level two seizure or a 
level three arrest, or vice versa. See United States v. Shareef, 
100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining relationship 
between levels of police-citizen encounters). Only the second 
and third levels, however, implicate the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 
1227 (Utah App. 1997). 
In the context of a traffic stop, "[a] person is seized 
under the Fourth Amendment when, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, the police conduct would have communicated to a 
reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the 
officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter and go 
about his or her business." State v. Hiqgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 
1244 (Utah 1994)(citing, inter alia, United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). And, once an individual is seized, 
for the seizure to end, it must be clear to the seized person, 
either from the words of an officer or from the clear import of 
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the circumstances, that the person is at liberty to go about his 
or her business. Hiqqins, 884 P.2d at 1244 (citing United States 
v, Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540-41 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
In determining whether a detainee is free to go, courts look 
to several circumstances. The return of a detained driver's 
documents signals one line of demarcation. Thus, federal courts 
"have consistently concluded that an officer must return a 
driver's documentation before a detention can end." United States 
v. Elliot. 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing United 
States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1996) and United 
States v. Werkina, 915 F.2d 1404, 1404 (10th Cir. 1990)). That 
action, however, will not necessarily render any subsequent 
interchange consensual "if the driver has objectively reasonable 
cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave." Shareef, 
100 F.3d at 1501 (citing United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 
959 (10th Cir.), cert, denied 502 U.S. 881 (1991)); accord 
Elliot, 107 F.3d at 814 (and cases cited therein). 
In evaluating the objective reasonableness of the 
circumstances facing a detainee, courts look especially to the 
conduct of the police towards the detainee: 
Examples of circumstances that might indicate 
a seizure, even where the person did not 
attempt to leave, would be the threatening 
presence of several officers, the display of 
a weapon by an officer, some physical 
touching of the person of the citizen, or the 
use of language or tone of voice indicating 
that compliance with the officer's request 
9 
might be compelled. 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted); 
accord State v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir. 1997); 
Turner, 928 F.2d at 959. 
Notably, however, the police need not explicitly tell the 
detainee that he or she is free to go in order for a seizure to 
de-escalate into a consensual encounter. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 
U.S. 33, 36 (1996). Thus, in Robinette, an officer stopped 
defendant along an interstate highway for speeding, asked him for 
his driver's license and registration, and ran a computer check. 
The check came back clear. The officer then asked defendant to 
get out of his vehicle. Defendant did so. The officer turned on 
his mounted video camera, issued a verbal warning to defendant, 
and returned his license. Id. at 35. With the video camera 
still running, the officer then asked, "One question before you 
get gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? 
Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?" Defendant 
answered "no" and then, subsequently, in response to the 
officer's request, gave permission to search the car, in which 
the officer found marijuana. Id. at 35-36. 
Under these factual circumstances, the Court upheld the 
voluntariness of defendant's consent, opining that "it would be 
unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees 
that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed 
10 
voluntary." Id. at 40. Thus, Robinette rejects a bright-line 
rule that a detention pursuant to a traffic stop cannot become 
consensual until an officer has explicitly told a detainee he is 
free to leave. 
An objective look at the totality of the circumstances here 
compels the conclusion that defendant was objectively free to go 
even though, as in Robinette, the officer did not explicitly so 
inform him. Officer Salas had issued a warning to defendant and 
had returned all of defendant's personal papers to him, just as 
in Robinette. In Robinette, however, several other indicia of 
police control remained that are notably absent in this case. 
First, the officer had asked Robinette to get out of his car, 
thus separating him from his means of freely leaving the scene 
(Id. at 35). Second, the officer turned on his video camera, 
thus reasonably indicating to Robinette that he was the focus of 
the ongoing recorded encounter (Id.). And, finally, the officer 
prefaced his question with the phrase, "One question before you 
get gone/' whose meaning may reasonably be interpreted as: "I 
need to ask you one question before you are free to go" (Id.). 
In contrast to Robinette, here Officer Salas requested that 
defendant get back in his car, thus specifically restoring 
defendant to his means of leaving the scene (R. 39: 5). Further, 
Officer Salas neither activated a video recorder nor prefaced his 
additional questions with any verbiage implying that defendant 
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had to remain on the scene. 
In addition, only a single officer was present. The record 
reveals no evidence that Officer Salas touched defendant, used a 
weapon in any way at all, spoke in an intimidating tone of voice, 
or otherwise engaged in a * coercive show of authority7' that would 
provide defendant with objectively reasonable grounds to believe 
he was not free to go. See, e.g., Turner, 928 F.2d at 959. 
The record unequivocally demonstrates that Officer Salas 
issued a warning citation and returned all of defendant's 
documentation without any coercive show of authority. At that 
point, the purpose of the original detention was fulfilled and 
the seizure, for Fourth Amendment purposes, ended. Contrary to 
defendant's assertions, then, the scope of the detention in this 
case remained within constitutional bounds. The subsequent 
interchange between defendant and the officer, consensual as a 
matter of law, accordingly does not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
POINT TWO 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF 
HIS VEHICLE DURING A VOLUNTARY POLICE-CITIZEN 
ENCOUNTER, HIS ATTENUATION ANALYSIS IS 
INAPPOSITE 
The crux of defendant's argument is that his consent to 
search was the product of an illegal detention. Absent 
attenuation from that illegality, he contends, his consent was 
invalid and the nine pounds of marijuana seized as the fruit of 
12 
the consent should be suppressed. See Br. of App. at 14-16. 
Defendant's argument is based on the rule of law that a 
consent to search, if obtained through police exploitation of a 
prior illegality, will only be valid if it is sufficiently 
attenuated from the preceding unlawful conduct. See, e.g., State 
v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). Defendant's argument 
fails because he premises it on the notion that he was unlawfully 
detained at the time he gave his consent to search. See Br. of 
App. at 15. Defendant does not dispute the voluntariness of his 
consent, arguing only that the evidence against him was obtained 
by exploiting a prior illegality. See Br. of App. at 6, 14. 
As has been explained in Point One, the seizure, properly 
analyzed for Fourth Amendment purposes, objectively de-escalated 
into a consensual police-citizen encounter after Officer Salas 
issued the warning citation to defendant and returned his 
documentation. At that juncture, defendant was free to go. It 
is undisputed that the officer requested consent to search after 
these two events had occurred. Consequently, because there was 
no police illegality, there was nothing from which to attenuate 
defendant's consent. For this reason, defendant's attenuation 
argument is inapposite. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this \fj>day of January, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
jjmM*^ C- MAW^^ 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Public Defender, 8 South 100 East, Moab, Utah 84532, this /&day 




Ruling on Motion to Suppress 
THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FUK GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 9917-34 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
The critical question in this case is whether the police 
officer violated defendants1 rights by inquiring about 
defendants travel plans. There is case authority supporting the 
proposition that the police may not expand the scope of a stop 
without reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity. It 
also seems to be accepted in other cases that the police do not 
violate an individuals rights by engaging in routine 
conversation. 
From the evidence presented in this case, it appears that 
the officer gained some information before checking the drivers 
license. This information was gained in the course of routine 
friendly conversation between the driver and the officer, which 
the law does not prohibit. The conversation after checking the 
1 
THE STATE OF UTAH vs ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR 
CASE NUMBER 9917-34 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
driver's license was not routine and would be permitted only if 
information gathered to that point gave rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. At that point, the officer knew: 
1. The driver was not from Nevada and had rented the car 
in Nevada. 
2. The driver said he sold Microsoft computers. Microsoft 
does not manufacture computers. 
3. There were white velvet bags on the front mirror and 
the rear dash. 
4. There was a strong fragrance of perfume or air 
freshener. 
This court believes it was reasonable to suspect something 
amiss under these circumstances. Accordingly, the officer was 
entitled to delay the driver to ask a few more questions. The 
answers to those questions did not allay the suspicion, but 
1
 Someone who actually sells computers could possibly answer this question in this 
way, meaning "computers that run on Microsoft software, as opposed to Apple." However, 
most salesmen would either name their manufacturer or say "IBM compatible". 
2 
THE STATE OF UTAH vs ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR 
CASE NUMBER 9917-34 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
heightened it slightly. The officer then appropriately asked for 
consent to search, which he received. 
The motion to suppress is denied. 
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THE STATE OF UTAH vs ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR 
CASE NUMBER 9917-34 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
COURT CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of July, 1999, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS to the 
following: 
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